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In view of the conflict that exists in this area of the law, legisla-
tive action seems desirable. Of the three parties involved, only the
governmental body has power to discharge and appoint public of-
ficers and to control the election machinery. Therefore, it can be
charged with the responsibility of preventing such disputes. The task
of the legislators should be to impose this responsibility upon govern-
mental bodies. This can be done by a statute which provides that (i)
the de jure officer shall be allowed to recover his back salary from the
governmental body in all cases of wrongful exclusion from office, ex-
cept where he has barred his recovery by waiver or estoppel; 30 and
(2) where the de facto officer has acted in bad faith, the de jure of-
ficer may elect whether to sue the de facto officer or the governmental
body. As between the de jure officer and the governmental body, this
rule is based upon sound legal principles, and is in accord with public
policy because the governmental body will be encouraged to prevent
such disputes through efficient handling of elections and appoint-
ments. As between the de jure officer and the de facto officer who acts
in good faith and under color of title, this statute will finally abolish
a harsh rule which the courts have felt compelled to apply.
J. T. TATE, JR.
CONDEMNATION: DAMAGES FOR IMPAIRMENT
OF ACCESS TO LAND
There is a need for a definite statement of the law relating to the
compensation of abutting owners of land on a free access highway
when that highway is changed to one of limited access. The land own-
er's loss may arise from either a complete or a partial taking of land
formerly abutting the highway. Moreover, the problem is not limited
to the taking of actual land, but includes the complete or partial taking
of the rights of direct access and the resulting diminution of property
value.
This area of the law of condemnation' was reviewed in the recent
case of Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham.2 The petitioners
3See note 8 supra for a discussion of what constitutes waiver or estoppel.
2"The law of condemnation is said to be grounded upon the realization that
eminent domain is government interference with, and the taking by it under its
authority, of private property for public use safeguarded by constitutional require-
ment of due process and just compensation." In re Cross-Bronx Expressway, 195
Misc. 842, 82 N.YS.2d 55, 65 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
2333 S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 196o).
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were the lessees and lessor of land abutting a highway serving traffic
between Benton and Little Rock, Arkansas. The leessees operated a
prosperous filling station on the property from 1955 to 1958. In 1958
the State Highway Commission condemned land to provide access
roads to proposed Interstate Route 3o, designed to be a limited access
road. The condemnation destroyed the petitioners' previous direct
access, took the land up to the gas pumps and resulted in a more circui-
tous route to the new highway. The jury awarded the lessees $3o,ooo
and the lessor $9,ooo damages basing the verdicts on estimates of value
of the property, investment loss, and diversion of traffic. 3 On appeal the
Arkansas Supreme Court modified the verdicts to $8,8oo and $6,150
respectively, these being the amounts suggested by the Commission's
own witness.4 The court recognized the majority American rule that
the right of access is a compensable property right when taken by the
state under the power of eminent domain,5 but denied the compensa-
tion prayed for. In finding that the rights of access were not deprived
the court reasoned that:(1) there was a taking of the direct access; (2)
a new access road replaced the previously direct way to the highway;
and (3) since there was still access (even though indirect) to the high-
way, a mere diversion was created and compensation on that ground
was denied. The more basic reason for the court's conclusion was the
public policy favoring the building of superhighways as shown by
the following language of the court: "For us to hold that such loss
by Leessee is compensable would amount to erecting an almost intol-
erable barrier in the way of further construction of super-highways." 6
'Id. at 734.
'in some jurisdictions when a verdict is thought to be excessive by the appel-
late court a remittitur is requested in which case the plaintiff may either refund
the excess money within a specified time or the case will be remanded for a new
trial. City of Sherman v. Gnadt, 337 S.W.2d 2o6, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1g6o). However,
a general method of modifying a judgment which is based on improper evidence
as to damages alone is for the appellate court to modify and then affirm. 3 Am. Jur.
Appeal and Error § 1173 (1936).
5People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.gd 15 (1953); Boxberger v. State
Highway Comm'n, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 92o (1953); State Roads Comm'n v.
Franklin, 201 Md. 549, 95 A.2d 99 (1953); Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass.
581, 121 N.E.2d 56 (1954). See generally, Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955). Most states
have constitutional provisions to compensate a land owner when either the state or
one acting under authority of the state condemns land for public or private use.
For a more comprehensive view of the basis for such compensation a compilation of
state constitutions is found in McCormick, Damages § 132 n.1 (1935). North Carolina
and New Hampshire have imposed this requirement through judicial opinion. See,
Opinion of the Justices, 66 N.H. 629, 33 Ad. 1076 (1891); Staton v. Norfolk &
C. R.R., 1i N.C. 278, 16 SE. 181 (1892). The Federal Constitution provides a simi-
lar protection. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
"333 S.W.2d at 734-
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In advocating the opposite view the dissenting justice stated that
there was a taking of the direct access and the resultant diversion
was merely incidental to that taking. He further said that property
rights such as rights of access should be protected irrespective of the
financial burden to the state.
7
The abbuting owner and the public share the same right to the
general use of the highway. In addition to this general right to the
use of the adjoining highway, the abutting owner has such exclusive
rights to the use and enjoyment of his property as access, light, air and
view.8 When the state appropriates means of access from the abutting
owner in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, a majority of
courts hold that compensation is paid only when there is a taking of
land in addition to a taking of the rights of access.9 Compensation is
due whether the right of access has been totally appropriated' ° or
substantially impaired by the public taking." Conversely, compensa-
tion for deprivation of access has been denied where there has been
no taking of the abutter's land. 12 Therefore, the relocation of a
highway,13 which causes the traffic to be diverted from the old high-
way, and the construction of a median strip,14 which prevents traffic
from crossing the road at all places, are construed as true diversions of
traffic or circuities of travel which are not compensable deprivations
7 1d. at 736.
,to McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 30.56 (3 d ed. 195o). In this comment
only the right of access that the abutter possesses is considered.
'State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 18, 350 P.2d 988 (ig6o); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.zd 859 (1945); State ex rel. Merritt
v. Linzell, z63 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955). Cf. McMinn v. Anderson, i8g Va.
289, 52 S.E.2d 67 (1949).
"0 Pike County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 81 So. 2d 288 (1955); Iowa State
Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.V.d 755 (1957); Turnpike Authority
v. Chandler, 316 P.2d 828 (Okla. 1957).
"State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. Vi8, 350 P.ad 988 (196o); Iowa State
Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957); Mississippi State
Highway Comm'n v. Finch, 114 So. 2d 673 (Miss. 1959).
"Jahoda v. Florida Road Dep't, io6 So. 2d 870 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958); Brady
v. Smith, 139 W. Va. 259, 79 S.E.2d 851 (1954) (by implication).
"3Hempstead County v. Huddleston, 182 Ark. 276, 31 S.W.2d 300 (1930); Tug-
gle v. Tribble, 177 Ark. 296, 6 S.V.d 312 (1928); Levee Dist. No. 9 v. Farmer,
io Cal. 178, 35 Pac. 569 (1894); State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126
N.E.2d 53 (1955)-
"City of Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938); Wilson
v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, go N.W.2d 16L (1958); Hamilton v.
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 220 Miss. 340, 70 So. 2d 856 (1954); State v. Fox,
53 Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958); Brady v. Smith, 139 W. Va. 259, 79 S.E.2d
851 (i9s4)-
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of access. The direct right has not been interfered with or impaired. 15
Finally, compensation has been denied where a valid exercise of the
police power regulated the rights of access. 16 The distinction between
police power and the power of eminent domain is narrow. Police
power is defined as the power to regulate people and property in
order to prevent harm to the public.'7 On the other hand, eminent
domain is the power to return land to the state in order to benefit
the public.'8
There is a difference of opinion among othec courts that have faced
the same problems presented in the principal case. The different views
are illustrated by the three cases of State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg,19
Jahoda v. Florida State Road Dep't,2° and Carazalla v. State.
2'
In Thelberg the abutter suffered a partial taking of his land for
a limited access highway. The old access was destroyed and replaced
with a more circuitous route by means of an access ramp.22 Upon
finding that the value of the remaining property was greatly reduced,
the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed a $10,750 verdict as compen-
sation for the impairment of access, stating:
"When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the
right of way of the conventional highway and the owner's in-
gress and egress to abutting property has been destroyed or sub-
stantially impaired, he may recover damages therefor .... Other
means of access such as frontage roads as in the instant case
may be taken into consideration in determining the amount
"This line of reasoning has generally been held to include situations where
land has been taken, but the direct access has not been changed as a result of the
taking, such as in the principal case. The famous case of Jones Beach Blvd. Estate
v. Moses, 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935), presented the situation wherein the
abutter was forced to go five miles out of his way to turn back to the side of the
highway on which he lived, because of being deprived of a left turn to his property.
The court held that the inconvenience was not compensable since the direct access
to one side of the road (the owner's) had not been interfered with. As to one-way
streets, see Chissell v. City of Baltimore, 193 Md. 535, 69 A.2d 53 (1949); Cavanaugh
v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51 (1926).
"Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis.
148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
"Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). The area in which the police power may
be exercised is unclear. See Pennsylvania Coal Co .v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). But
see Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1918).
"MacVeigh v. Multnomah County, 126 Ore. 417, 270 Pac. 502 (1928)).
1087 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (196o).
2'1o6 So. 2d 870 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958).
2269 Wis. 593, 70 'N.V.2d 208, rev'd on rehearing, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W.2d
276 (1955).
"An access ramp is a service road which provides safer means of access to a
limited access highway. It is generally more circuitous than that possessed before the
closing of direct access. The terms service road and access road are synonymous.
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which would be just under the circumstances.... Other means
of access may mitigate damages ... but does not constitute a de-
fense to the action .... ,,23
Although a taking of land generally warrants compensation for
a concurrent deprivation of access,2 4 one court has specifically re-
jected this view. In Jahoda v. Florida State Road Dep't the court
denied compensation to an abutting owner who had suffered a
partial taking of land and a deprivation of access on the ground that
one who loses both land and access loses no more because of the loss
of access than does one who is only deprived of access. 2 5 Since no
compensation is allowed in the latter situation, none should be al-
lowed in the former. The reasoning is as follows: if A and B are
owners of adjacent filling stations and a condemnation takes land
from A but not from B, while both are deprived of direct access, under
the Thelberg doctrine A would recover and B would not. Because
this result is inequitable, compensation will be denied to both under
the Jahoda theory.
26
Carazalla v. State27 represents the third approach to the problem.
In that case the state had condemned a portion of the abutter's
land for the relocation of a highway which divided the plaintiff's
land. The relocated highway was to be of a limited access type and no
access points were provided where the highway was to cross the abut-
ter's land. Therefore a more circuitous route via the old highway had
to be followed to reach the largest part of the land. The Wisconsin
court granted compensation to the plantiff on the ground that the
taking of the land for the new highway had caused a reduction in
'State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, 992 (196o)
(Emphasis added.) The rule laid down in the Thelberg case has been previously
announced in somewhat different form in two other jurisdictions. Thus, state ap-
propriation of an abutter's land which resulted in a substantial impairment of
access was held compensable in Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith. 248 Iowa
869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957), wherein access to the abutter's land could only be gained
by traveling across the lot of his adjoining filling station. The court felt that unless
a better means of access was provided, the state would be obliged to pay just com-
pensation for taking the right of access to the residence. A similar view was ex-
pressed in Pike County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 81 So. 2d 288 (1955), which held
that the issue of damages resulting from the diversion of traffic was a proper question
for the jury. In California there is doubt as to the actual status of the question.
Compare People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 ('943), with People v.
Ayon, 5 Cal. R. 151, 352 P.2d 519 (1g6o). See generally, Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 689
(196o); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955).
"See note 9 supra.
2See note 20 supra.
"In the Jahoda case the Florida court adopted the dissenting opinion of Pike
County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 81 So. 2d 288 (1955)-
ZSee note 21 supra.
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value to the remainder of the property.28 However, on rehearing, the
supreme court reversed itself by stating that no compensation would be
allowed where a diminution in property value was caused by the exer-
cise of police power. The plaintiff contended that the loss was occa-
sioned by the taking of land which deprived him of direct access to the
separate portion of his land. The court rejected this contention by
stating that the land appropriated for the relocated highway was taken
under eminent domain and was paid for by the state, but the right of
access was obtained by use of the police power for the general welfare.2 9
Since a loss of access due to the exercise of police power is not com-
pensable, the plaintiff was precluded from recovery for this element
of his alleged damage.3 0 The real impact of the statement referring
to use of the police power is that it may by implication refer to all
takings in this type of case. If this reasoning were followed, the public
right would be the dominant force over the private right of the
abutter, and compensation for deprivation of access as to limited
access roads could be denied. This theory has been suggested by one
writer3l as a method of curtailing superhighway construction cost. It
would eliminate the expense of compensating the abutter for his loss
of access rights by simply not recognizing those rights. However, there
is no direct authority to substantiate this line of reasoning.
Thus the decisions vary greatly on the subject of the direct access
rights of the abutter. They range from a liberal protection to a strict
curtailment of abutter's rights. The Bingham case appears to rec-
ognize access rights to a limited degree and illustrates the difficulty
the courts face in deciding questions in this area.
This whole problem must be analyzed in the light of the times
in which it arises. Today a tremendous burden has been placed on
the state and federal governments to meet the demands of increased
traffic. The protection of the fundamental property right involved
is thought prohibitive by some and necessary by others. Whichever
line of reasoning is followed will result in inequities, but the issue
remains-does the state owe to its citizens the right to make a living
within its territorial sovereignty? If this question is answered in the
affirmative, it may be argued that the state will be subsidizing a single
-Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N-V.2d 208, 211 (1955).
2Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N.W.2d 276, 278 (1955).
31Id. at 278.
m'Moody, Condemnation of Land for Expressway or Highway, 33 Texas L. Rev.
357 (1955). Moody suggests that the rights of access may not be recognized in con-
demnation suits for expressways unless the condemnor (state) is willing to recog-
nize that right at the time of the taking. Id. at 368.
